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Abstract (around 150 words – style ‘Abstract Title’) 
Information security assured on centralised systems through application of principles previously 
established for paper-based systems. The advent of personal computing and distributed computing 
potentially turned that model upside down. It seems that the eagerness of organisations for 
encouraging technology (Availability part of the CIA acronym) seemed to take precedence over the 
finer meaning of Confidentiality and Integrity, in spite of (in the UK, at least) changes to legislation. 
 
The huge increase in portable data storage capacities ensured that what may have been perceived as a 
minor irritant in the 1980s became a potential nightmare scenario by 2007, which caused two 
government reports to report “systemic failure”. This paper looks at the development of end-user 
computing, and suggests that the problem occurred because of a lack of information risk assessment 
over many years 
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1. Introduction 
End user computing became very popular in the late 1980s, and had become the norm 
in organisations by the mid 1990s. This paper examines the opportunities and 
challenges presented to organisations by end-user computing, and the emergence of 
information risk in connection with this (then) new phenomenon.  
 
2. Information Security Procedures before End-User Computing 
2.1 Pre-Digital Information 
Stored information, and its security, has been an issue whenever civilised society has 
emerged and organisations have made records. Information was kept secure either in 
people’s brains or held in paper-based systems. The management and security of 
organisational  information held on paper became more of a challenge as more paper 
was generated, and the main issue was to keep the stored data physically safe 
(integrity), make it readily available to those with authorisation (availability) and 
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restrict access to it to those “with a need to know” (confidentiality). In that respect, 
the oft-quoted C-I-A acronym is nothing new. When information was on the move 
outside a secure trusted environment, greater safeguards (more physical protection) 
may have been necessary depending on the sensitivity of the information. The 
“insider threat” was anticipated in the UK through the passing of legislation, “The 
Official Secrets Act” (HMSO, 1911) making the disclosure of classified information a 
criminal offence. It is interesting that legislation was at that point regarded as an aid to 
the use of physical security, to control sensitive information. However, it seems that 
the combination of legislative and a “secure facility with request desk” approach – 
akin to the secure section in a public library - was successful in maintaining the 
integrity of organisational information through the first half of the 20th century, and 
on into the 1960s. 
 
2.2 Early Digital Security Model (Business as Usual?) 
The emergence of digital media for storing information, and computer programs for 
processing information immediately provided new challenges for information systems 
professionals, but not immediately.  Only very large organisations had computing 
facilities at all, and the computing facility of the 1960s/70s was designed around a 
vast centralised computing area and request desk to provide controlled access to 
information. Although processing was digital, the digital information stored was only 
available through being printed out and checked out to someone who was able to 
physically show that they had appropriate authority. 
 
The printed information itself would be subject to the same safeguards as anything 
else recorded on paper, so existed well tried-and-tested systems were considered 
adequate, and no new systems needed to be devised. 
 
2.3 Taking Digital Data outside the Data Centre 
During the early 1970s, most organisations continued to use their own derivations of 
the existing security model for information, merely applying these well-tried-and-
tested principles to digital data. However, with technological advances it had become 
possible to present digital information on a TV screen, as opposed to a paper print-
out, which would be useful to management for analysis and decision-making. 
Consequently, when a viable commercial Visual Display Unit product (VDU) was 
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launched by the Wang Corporation (Kenney, 1992), organisational pressures from 
management rapidly built up to allow information to be at least displayed, if not 
printed out, outside that secure data processing area. An influential report from the 
RAND Corporation in the USA (Ware, 1970) at the start of this decade had 
anticipated some of the problems that became apparent as digital information started 
to become available outside a centralised secure area for the first time.  
 
The mere use of a VDU system with no processing or storage ability should not in 
itself provide a security threat. The main danger would appear to be the leaking of 
information that had been printed out, and provided that existing procedures for 
dealing with computer print-outs were adhered to there was no reason to think that 
this was a problem. There was a further difference here, however, in that data could 
also be processed by people “outside the centre” and the move to VDUs opened up 
the potential for user-computer interactivity and ultimately for what became known as 
“end-user computing”. Also, through invention of the modem, it became possible for 
digital data to be transmitted from through public systems such as the telephone 
network. There was now the capability for users to both store data and send it to 
others – for example to other parts of a national or multi-national company, or a 
government department, or a bank ATM machine.  
 
As digital data was now able to be sent from place to place within and beyond the 
organisation, rather than merely sitting on a mainframe, it clearly needed more 
protection. Cryptography, once the domain of the secret services, was now used for 
the first time commercially using a system with a 56-bit key known as The Data 
Encryption Standard, DES, (FIPS, 1975). This would secure commercial data sent 
between sites by encrypting/decrypting at the communication ends. Also, the danger 
of unauthorised external access to the mainframe became a potential issue and a 
security device was invented (Caudill et all, 1976) that would ensure password only 
access (series of digits). 
 
As the end-user phenomenon continued to grow, it was perceived at EU and UK 
government levels (Hansard, 1983) that public concerns about the leakage of their 
personal data from organisations were rising. In Europe a legal directive was passed 
by the European Union (EU, 1981) to protect such data. In the UK, this debate 
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mentioned earlier eventually became the 1984 Data Protection Act (HMSO, 1984), 
but the emerging issue of end-user computing did not feature highly in the eight data 
protection principles enshrined in that act (Appendix 1). However, at this stage in 
developments, encryption was generally not considered for the storage of 
organisational data because the data was stored safely and securely on a mainframe or 
minicomputer.  
 
3. Organisational Issues with End-User Computing 
3.1 Local Processing with the Desktop Computer 
As users became accustomed to using local VDUs interacting with a central storage 
facility, and management benefited from rapid access to information through this new 
source, consumers started to buy microcomputers for their homes. Organisations 
could envisage uses for computers on the desktop. This encouraged to IBM release 
their own microcomputer, the PC (Personal Computer), and “end-user computing” 
(EUC) began in earnest within organisations.  
 
The first research articles on EUC and its management began to emerge in the early 
1980s. A field study by Rockart & Flannery (1983) correctly predicted the meteoric 
growth of this phenomenon and identified as many as six different types of user. A 
study in the St Louis area, in the USA (Benson, 1983) involving interviews with 
management clarified that use of IBM PCs in the US was widespread. Many reasons 
and benefits were reported including, higher speed of processing and greater richness 
of data than VDU units and consequent increased employee productivity.  This was 
much more significant than previous developments relating to information security; 
the IBM PC was a potentially huge threat to integrity and confidentiality because data 
could now be processed and saved locally by users inexperienced in dealing with 
digital data. 
  
Further research (Henderson & Treacy, 1986) based on the Rockart & Flannery model 
spelled out the complexities of managing end-user computing more clearly, and 
identified security of data on end-user machines as a potential issue that needed to be 
managed. They also spelled out the benefits of end-user computing and saw potential 
competitive advantage for organisations that used it wisely.  
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2.2. The uncontrolled growth of organisational End-User Computing 
The use of the microcomputer in organisations seemed assured by the late 1980s. In 
theory, however, there was nothing to stop an employee copying to floppy disk and 
taking the disk out with them, but issues such as data protection on a microcomputer 
or personal computer (PC) was not seen as high priority. Academic research had 
highlighted the potential security issues presented by digital data that could be 
processed by and extracted from a computer by the user at will. However, it seems 
that security of digital data often did not become the organisational priority it should 
have been. The call for better management of end-user computing (Rockart & 
Flannery, 1983) was often seen in terms of maximising organisational benefits (i.e. 
productivity gains and cost savings), rather than management of security – which also 
came out of the research. The result was an encouragement of employee engagement 
with the microcomputer and the facilitation of competent use, in priority to training in 
secure handling of digital information. It may have been perceived that too much 
focus on security would increase cost and possibly reduce productivity. Academic 
end-user computing research during this time (e.g. Doll & Torkzadeh, 1988) tended to 
focus on end-user satisfaction, rather than security concerns.  
 
In these early days of the microcomputer, a PC would be working in standalone mode. 
As there was no physical or logical connection to larger, centralised systems 
containing organisational data, this provided some kind of safeguard against both 
internal and external threats. Organisational data would not have seemed to be under 
any particular threat. However, Data Processing (often now rebadged MIS 
(Management Information Systems) ) departments with appropriate expertise and 
centralised control of organisational data would have been looking with some concern 
at what Yourdon (1990) called the “cocky novice” – the self-taught employee who 
handed departmental data with independence and lack of supervision, but had an 
exaggerated opinion of their own knowledge and understanding. MIS managers were 
aware of this already (Benjamin et al, 1985) but had not yet come to terms with what 
to do about it. They could expect that their role would become more distributed, but 
not yet how this would be managed strategically from an organisational point of view. 
One of the authors of this paper worked in such an organisation in 1990 and heard the 
MIS manager regularly articulate such concerns. It seems reasonable to conclude, 
therefore, that, although end-user computing grew in line with expectations, and key 
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issues had been clearly identified (Brancheau & Brown, 1987) a coherent model for 
its management had not been either acknowledged or implemented – PCs were 
typically held within departments, and outside the control of MIS.  
 
By the early 1990s, it had been widely recognised (Brancheau & Brown, 1993) that 
the benefits emerging from end-user computing were of two distinct types: 
organisational, and individual. The “individual” benefits of training in the use of 
applications would subsequently benefit departments, an in turn this would benefit the 
organisation. The siren voices of MIS managers had not, in many cases, been heard, 
and most PC users would not have received the rigorous information security training 
on that their MIS colleagues had previously received, even through they were 
handling organisational data. Some organisations did start to apply risk analysis 
techniques to their information systems (Rainer et al, 1991) but most relied on file 
system security, without properly assessing the increased risk of saving to portable 
devices. 
 
2.3 Security Consequences as Technology moved relentlessly on 
The rapid transition from centralised multi-user systems to PC-based systems may not 
have seemed a big step at the time, but retrospectively, it was the quantum leap in 
terms of what followed. Certainly, a greater consideration should have been given to 
the way microcomputer systems locally save applications data, as opposed to merely 
reading data that is only held centrally. The term “read only” meant something in the 
days of centralised storage, but a “read only” Word document, for example, is 
automatically saved locally on a temporary basis when it is used, and can easily be 
saved permanently with a different filename. This was a BIG change from systems 
conventionally available in centralised multi-user systems, and again a possible cause 
of security concern. A “mixed environment” network including Unix terminals and 
PCs with fileservers had been subjected to academic investigation over several years, 
but PC security had not been considered as a problem and indeed the author of an 
evaluative report based on this investigation (Stayanarayanan, 1989) suggested a 
rejection of the more secure diskless PC workstations from a performance 
perspective. It should be remembered that at this time, PCs were not very powerful, 
and the focus on helping employees to get the job done was understandable. 
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Huge advances have been made in the processing capabilities and storage facilities 
associated with organisational information systems from the early 1990s to present 
day. PCs became routinely networked and were consequently given access to 
corporate and personal data within information systems that had been designed for 
storage and processing a centralised approach, with a legal framework assuming such 
an approach (HMSO, 1984). Yet the author can find no research in the literature that 
explores the legal implications of organisational use of PCs to store and process data. 
 
Capabilities for the local storage of data were enhanced a thousand times as first the 
CD, and later the DVD became widely available. As personal computer networks 
became connected to other networks via the rapidly growing Internet, this offered the 
capability for such data to become available beyond the organisation without the 
normal security safeguards associated with centralised data processing.  This not only 
involved copying locally to portable media, but the sending of data directly through 
cabled and even wireless media. In the UK, an opportunity to tighten up the eight data 
protection principles in view of the hugely increased role of PC data was overlooked 
in when the act was updated in 1998 (HMSO, 1998). It was not until very recently 
that, as a result of the loss of huge amounts of personal information and a consequent 
inquiry reporting “systemic failure” (Poynter Report, 2008), there has there been a 
slight strengthening of this legislation (HMSO, 2008). A further announcement from 
the ICO on strengthening the legislation is due on April 6th 2010. 
 
3. Conclusion 
The emergence of end-user computing in the 1980s and the file security issues raised 
with PC-based systems challenged the conventional centralised information security 
model for organisations. Whilst many aspects of end-ser computing have been 
positive, and computing has concern about end-user computing extended to security 
matters, this one fundamental security issue with local computer file systems, 
especially when connected to distributed networks, has still to be fully addressed. 
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